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Analytics

When Fouling with a 3 Point Lead IS the RIGHT Call (End of Game Breakdown)

By Brian Williams on June 3, 2026

 
Stephen Halstead, Assoc Head Men’s Basketball Coach, Grace College

This video is a segment from one of the 120 Videos in Glazier Drive Basketball.

Explore coaching clinic replays, practice plans, skill development videos, and more.  Click here to see all that’s included.

The full video that this clip came from is available on Glazier Drive:  End-of-Game Situations & Clock Management.

LATE-GAME FOULING STRATEGY: DATA-DRIVEN INSIGHTS FOR COACHES

This video breaks down research on a critical late-game decision: when you’re up three, should you foul or defend a potential tying three-pointer? Here’s what the data shows for men’s college basketball.

THE CORE QUESTION

When a trailing team is down three and attempting a tying three, should the leading team foul intentionally or play normal defense? The answer depends heavily on how much time is left on the clock.

WHAT THE DATA TRACKS

The study segments game situations into four time windows — 0–4, 4–8, 8–12, and 12–16 seconds remaining — and measures three outcomes: overtime rate, regulation comeback wins, and overall win percentage for the leading team.

KEY FINDINGS BY TIME WINDOW

  • 12–16 seconds, no foul: The trailing team forced overtime 16.7% of the time and actually won in regulation 25% of the time. That’s a significant risk for the leading team.
  • 8–12 seconds, no foul: Overtime rate drops to 9%.
  • 4–8 seconds, no foul: Overtime rate drops further to 7%.
  • 0–4 seconds, no foul: Three-point shooting drops to 17%, overtime rate is 16.9%, but regulation comeback wins are rare. The leading team wins about 92% of the time.

THE FOULING ADVANTAGE

When the leading team intentionally fouls a non-shooter (not a three-point shooter) in a non-threatening position — such as near half court — the win rate jumps to approximately 95% compared to 92% when defending normally. That 3% difference can be decisive over a season.

IMPORTANT CONTEXT: COLLEGE VS. NBA

This data is specific to men’s college basketball. In the NBA, the numbers actually favor defending normally rather than fouling. Coaches must apply the right data set to their level of play.

COACHING TAKEAWAY

The presenter’s staff commits to fouling before the opposing team crosses half court with under 8 seconds remaining. The key principles are:

  • Never foul a three-point shooter
  • Foul in a non-threatening position (near half court)
  • Decide your threshold as a staff — 8 seconds, 10 seconds, etc. — and make sure your players know it

Having a clear, practiced rule eliminates hesitation in crunch-time moments and gives your team the best statistical chance of closing out the game.

Basketball’s “Red Zone”

By Brian Williams on September 20, 2019

This article is republished with permission. It was written by DoSicko and originally appeared on HoopCoach.org.

Football coaches have long analyzed their team’s offensive and defensive efficiencies inside the red zones.  The thinking is simple, “We got inside the 20; we better damn well score.”  Teams have special red zone plays and red zone practice time.  And well they should; the effort to move the ball there and the relatively low number of possessions makes it incumbent on teams to come away with points once the ball is that deep in enemy territory.

Speaking of possessions, one of the inherent difficulties of coaching basketball is getting players to understand the value of a possession.  The high number of possessions in a basketball game at any level lends itself to thinking like this, “Big deal, we’ve got a zillion more possessions in this game; who cares if we turned it over or took a bad shot?”  This lack of understanding is not restricted to young players but is certainly more prevalent among lesser experienced players.  I remember asking players at camps how many possessions there were in a game.  Of course, the number depends on the playing tempo of both teams.  But many campers didn’t even have a clue.  Getting these players to first realize that possessions are finite is a start.

With that said, any device one can use to break the game down into smaller pieces for teaching purposes is extremely valuable.  One such breakdown is an analysis of how one’s team performs in basketball’s “red zone”.

It shouldn’t be difficult to designate a basketball red zone.  For me, it would clearly start with the key and most likely include the low blocks and the high post.  One could add the elbows and the mid-post areas, if one so chooses.  No matter.  It’s your analysis, so you make the call.

Before we get ahead of ourselves, it’s probably wise to dispel the importance of the concept of “points in paint”.  For years, this stat has been quoted like it’s totally conclusive.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  It merely indicates the number of points scored on field goals in the paint and ignores several other important types of points scored in addition to just field goals:

  1. It does not include free throws scored directly on shooting fouls in the paint or at the low block.  For example, over the course of a game, if Team A makes 9 FT’s on shooting fouls “in the paint”, those points need to be added to the “points in the paint” tally.
  2. It does not account for the FT’s made after the one-and-one kicks in-that were directly the result of a foul made before the bonus because of offensive penetration in the paint off the bounce or by pass.  For example, let’s say that 3 non-shooting fouls were committed because the ball entered the “red-zone” before the one-and-one kicked in and that the bonus kicked in at 7 fouls.  Theoretically, every “points in the paint” FT scored after the bonus is 3/7 or 42.9% attributable to fouls in the paint before the bonus.  If 12 FT’s were made after the bonus, then 12 X 42.9% is 5 points that needs to be added to the “points in the paint” tally.

So, let’s say that a game stat sheet said Team A scored 24 points in the paint.  If one adds the 9 FT’s scored on “in the paint shooting fouls” and the 5 FT’s scored on one and one FT’s scored after the bonus kicked in, the ACTUAL points in the point tally is 38 points (24+9+5).

Now, let’s go back to “red zone” analysis.  To accurately analyze red-zone efficiency, one must also add 2 and 3 point FG’s that were scored as a result of getting the ball into the “red zone”, as the defense adjusted to the penetration and the offense kicked the ball back out to the perimeter for a shot.  Let’s say that Team A makes 4- 2 point FG’s (8 points) and 5-3 point FG’s (15 points) attributable to red zone penetration, the total number of “red zone” points for Team A is 61 (24+9+5+8+15).

It’s obvious that the points in the paint total of 24 points on the stat sheet and the 61 “red zone” points tell two completely different stories and that “red zone” points is a far more telling stat than “points in the paint”.

To analyze “red zone” efficiency then, one needs to compute “red zone” penetrations and divide the points by penetrations. (perhaps in our hypothetical example 61 points divided by 47 penetrations or 1.290.  Obviously, this number, in of itself, only tells us something when compared to other games.  But the biggest advantage is that it helps coaches first understand patterns of success and failure. The bottom line is that the coach is constantly assessing these two questions, “How and why did we score when we get the ball in red zone and how and why didn’t we score?”  But, perhaps just as important as the success/failure ratio of red zone efficiency is just the simple concept of getting the ball there.  If players are totally cognizant of the importance of getting the ball there, their notion of the importance of each possession will also improve.

Then too, one can assess defensive “red zone” efficiency and the questions become, “How and why did we stop our opponent from scoring or how and why did our opponents score when they get the ball into the red zone.  The simple concept of preventing opponents from getting the ball in the red zone will also serve to help players realize the importance of each defensive possession.

Points Per Shot by Zone

By Brian Williams on February 26, 2019

Originally titled “The 40/60/80 Club”

By Stephen Shea, Ph.D. (@SteveShea33)

Editor’s note from Brian: Yes you have to play to your individual players’ strengths, and some of your individual player’s strengths might be long 2s. The data is presented to stimulate some thought as to what types of skills you want to work on to develop in your players, and how you want to structure your offensive and defensive philosophy and tactics.

These are NBA data and the NBA 3 point arc is constructed differently than college and high school. I still believe that there are applications of this information to those levels.

Analytics have had no more obvious influence on the game of basketball than on shot selection, and the influence extends beyond the suggestion to take more threes.

The best shots are from behind the arc, at the hoop and at the free-throw line.

(The points per shot for free throws is for a 2 shot free throw situation)

Even though high school does not have a “restricted area,” you can still use the visual from college and professional games to get an idea where those shots are taken, even on a court without that marking.

As a result, NBA teams are taking half as many mid-range jumpers as they did 20 years ago. And there’s no sign of that trend slowing down.

If teams are strategizing to take more shots at the hoop, from three and from the free-throw line, then it’s only natural that they should want the players that are the most efficient from those regions.

We introduce the 40/60/80 Club, an exclusive group of go-to NBA scorers that shoot better than 40% from three, 60% from the restricted area and 80% from the free-throw line.

Editor’s note from Brian: Just an idea that you might be able to apply to your players. In my opinion, looking at overall field goal percentage (combining 2s and 3s as field goal attempts is not a very helpful statistic. Breaking shots into restricted area, other 2’s, 3’s and free throws give you a much better idea of where you are strong and where you need to improve–both from an offensive and defensive point of view.

Dr. Shea has co-authored two books on the subject of utilizing analytical data in basketball. You can find out more about both books by clicking on the links or images of the book covers below.

Basketball Analytics: Objective and Efficient Strategies for Understanding How Teams Win

Basketball Analytics: Spatial Tracking

Your Team’s Shot Selection

By Brian Williams on December 11, 2017

By Stephen Shea, Ph.D. (@SteveShea33) and published on his blog:  Basketball Analytics.  You can find out more about Dr. Shea and his work in the field of Basketball Analytics below the article.

Editor’s Note from Brian The purpose of this post is to offer some ideas about applying these analytics to what you currently do and improve how you evaluate your offensive execution.  You probably won’t be able to apply all of this, but hopefully you can use parts of it to help your players understand and measure how you want your team to play on offense.  I have included screenshots of part of the tables as a way to add context to the points that Dr. Shea makes.

If you want to view the entire article including sortable data tables for all NBA teams, you can click here: What if Your Team had Houston’s Shot Selection I realize that the shorter distances for different 3 point shots does not apply to high school and college, but I also believe that there are specific spots on the arc that your players shoot better from, or at least favor as spots for 3 point attempts.

And, of course, we have to coach to our player’s strengths, but if we develop and play players whose strength is mid range, then we will be limited in the effectiveness of our offense, just as we would be limiting our offense if our primary ball handler could only dribble towards their strong hand.

I also realize that free throw shooting is even more efficient than field goal shooting, and that you are going to get to the line more frequently by attacking the basket. That has to be factored in. Free throw scoring efficiency is tied to the ability of the free throw shooter. A 70% free throw shooter will score, on average, 1.40 points per 2 shot free throw possession, which is better tan any of these. To me, that still points out that paint shots outside the restricted area and mid range shots are the worst ways to attempt to score.

As always, my goal is to provide food for you and your staff to use to work to improve your program. I do believe that analytics have a place in the decision making processes for basketball coaches, but that it is not the only tool to use.

End of Editor’s Note

What if your team had Houston’s shot selection?
Stephen Shea, Ph.D.

There are 5 major shooting zones on an NBA court: the restricted area (at the hoop), the paint (but not in the restricted area), mid-range, corners, and above the break. Among the zones, the paint and mid-range shots are, by far, the least efficient.

One team has leveraged this information to design a strategy that attempts to greatly reduce paint and mid-range shots. This season, just 7.6% of Houston’s field goal attempts have come from the paint and just 5.8% have come from mid-range. Both percentages are league lows.

Houston’s shot selection is far from the norm. While mid-range attempts are on the decline, many teams are still taking 20% or more of their shots from this inefficient region. What if they didn’t?

As a thought exercise, let’s suppose every team had Houston’s shot selection. We’ll keep each team’s field goal percentages from each zone the same. For example, Sacramento has shot 36.6% from mid-range this season and taken 28.1% of their shots from that region. We’ll assume Sacramento maintains their 36.6% but that they only take 7.6% of their FGA from mid-range (Houston’s percentage).

We’ll measure the team’s shooting efficiency by points per shot (PPS). The table below contains each team’s current PPS, their hypothetical PPS with Houston’s shot selection (labeled NewPPS), the difference between the hypothetical and actual PPS, and the additional points per game the team would score with Houston’s shot selection.

Shot selection can impact shooting efficiency, and so, it wouldn’t be fair to suggest that a team could radically alter their shot selection tomorrow and maintain their shooting efficiencies from each zone. Still, when we see that a team like Sacramento would produce 12.6 more points per game with their current field goal percentages and Houston’s shot selection, we have to ask, why aren’t they trying?

Tempo, Tempo, Tempo!

By Brian Williams on November 1, 2017

This post was written by Andy Rochon. He is the boys JV coach and Varsity Assistant at Ocoee High School in west Orlando. His site is about his system of Symmetrics. He has several other posts on the site with ideas for quantifying ball movement and player decision making. Click the link to see more of his concepts: Symmetrics

Editor’s Note from Brian. I realize that many coaches reading this blog do not have the time or the resources to apply all of these ideas. However, I hope that you might be able to apply some of the concepts on a smaller scale. If you have a player or two that you are trying to get to react quicker or be more aware, you could apply some of these ideas to help them. Or, you could time just a few possessions just to identify where the sweet spot is for your team.

**Pete Carril said, “be good at all things that happen a lot.” I truly believe that is the cornerstone of what Symmetrics is about!**

Now it is time to take a look into HOW we track Tempo. The 3 parts of Tempo are Pace(total number of possessions), Player Movement(average speed at which players cut/sprint while performing decision/action), and Average Length of each possession on offense/defense). When I was an assistant at State College of Florida I had one player that these three numbers helped tremendously, especially on the defensive side of the ball. It was a neat process to watch him go from being inactive/disinterested to a bouncy/active defender who averaged 2.8 blocks per game at 6’6.

Here is how you can apply the numbers to your coaching philosophy/game plan. Knowing the Pace or how many possessions your team creates in a game is important. This lets you know if you are getting enough offensive opportunities. Opportunities are vital for teams, while the amount of good opportunities may be important for others. Either way my colleagues has expressed know how many possession their team averages a game is a stat they want to know.

Next, is Player Movement and this is a little bit tougher to track each instance an action/decision is committed. This is why we have each player perform 5 trials of a given action/decision, add each individual score and divide people total number of teammates who performed the action/decision, and that is how we get a verage speed of each action/decision. These numbers are very similar to average speed numbers the NBA is tracking on the SportVu cameras(average speed while sprinting up/down floor, total miles ran, ect). These numbers let a coach know if their players are are putting in the EFFORT or playing with ENERGY you want your players to play with.  In Symmetrics we call this the   JUICE INDICATOR and will be solely based on how much energy you expend while playing the game(aka the faster you move the more energy you produce).

The last and most important part(my opinion)to tracking Tempo is the average time spent on offense vs average time spent on defense. Why is this important you might ask? Back in ‘07 when the Phoenix Suns 7 seconds or less uptempo style was popular it was important for them know how many times they got a shot in 7 seconds or less, how many possessions did this take place, and stats showing how efficiently they performed in these situations(makes/misses, turnovers, fouls, ect). Knowing that information allows the staff to know whether or not to tell them to perform the action more or less based on stats look. For example, when I was at SCG our offensive style was similar to the Spurs. We wanted to come up the floor, move the ball, drive and kick to get 3 or best shot in the paint. If our time on offense was only averaging 10 seconds I would urge our players to make a few more passes, foot fight with their defender when they catch, or enter the ball to the post. All three of these decisions that turn to actions allowed us to possess the ball just a few seconds longer. Which gives more time for the defense to breakdown or make a mistake. May seem minor, but ball/player movement makes all the difference possession by possession when wearing down an opponent. Defensively, to wear down opponents we would really get out and put pressure on the ball. Our secondary defenders aka help side would sit in gaps to protect against dribble penetration(pack line principles w/pressure on the ball). This didn’t allow for ball handle to be comfortable and make direct line passes, and it didn’t up as many uncontested shots because we closed out to everything like pack line teams do.

Here is how Raheem and I would go over these numbers. On the bus ride home(it’s juco so usually 2+ hour trips)we would sit and just talk hoops. He would tell me about his life living between Canada and the United States, the players he has had the opportunity to play with and against, as well as his overall knowledge of the game. Somewhere in between him talking about his Juco stint in Casper, Wyoming he said something that I’ll never forget. Raheem said, “Coach I feel like in my head I know what to do, but I can’t get my teammates to do it or sometimes I mess it up.” To me this is a kid who is trying to be a leader for a team full of players who were trying to get theirs. This is when we started talking about Player Decision-Making.

After, each game we got on the bus and sat down and talked about the good, the bad, and the downright horrific!! Yes, there were times where we would have to agree to disagree. That is the beauty of Symmetrics, it is all about tracking your decisions/actions and you do not have to change if you do not want to(Your playing time may though). A typical night riding home on a big charter bus we would watch college basketball on our phones and I would go through the team report. For example, I’d say, “Heem as a team we were 1st help defender was Late to help on dribble penetration 18 times, we gave up 14 points on 4/6 shooting(2 3pt FG), they drew 5 fouls, and our 2nd help wasn’t there 11 of 18 times our 1st help was late. I’d explain to him what a contested shot looked like, how many he attempted vs how many he made, and other actions/decisions he could do more of to score a few extra basketball because of his great athleticism(Offensive Rebounds/Tip ins).

Now I’m telling you we did this almost after every game, except for the really hard loses or the few major wins we had that year. He truly changed as a player, not because I am a genius, but because he was willing to listen and grow as a player. I wanted to observe to see how well he would understand terminology, how quickly he was able to apply the information, and Symmetrics was the reason he became aware enough to ACT instead of REACT to situations on the floor.

Over the last three seasons I have tracked Tempo in this way and have found it extremely useful for our coaching staff and players.

Now I want to share Symmetrics with as many coaches possible who are looking to have an immediate impact on their team! This is not to reinvent your philosophy or revamp your style of play. Symmetrics is just to categorize and organize your philosophy into simple cues, in your terminology, that players and your coaching staff can easily remember and apply to practice or games right away!

Thanks again for reading this if you stuck around until the end. Spend some time this weekend thinking about which decisions/actions you value or do not value. Then begin plugging them into the various Risk categories. Is the decision which leads to an action low in risk and high in reward? Then it belongs in the Low Risk category. Is the decision high in risk and low in reward? Then it needs to be added to the High Risk category. If the action is something that depends on the player’s skill set, time/situation, and/or positive only outweighs negative by a little or vise versa then it belongs in the Mid Risk + or – category pending on which one carries more weight.(ie: 50/50 ball= Mid Risk+ because there are more positive outcomes by diving for a loose ball instead of trying to dribble a loose ball).

About the Author of This Post

This post was written by Andy Rochon. He is the boys JV coach and Varsity Assistant at Ocoee High School in west Orlando. His site is about his system of Symmetrics. He has several other posts on the site with ideas for quantifying ball movement and player decision making.

How Progressive is Your Team’s Offense?

By Brian Williams on September 24, 2017

By Stephen Shea, Ph.D. (@SteveShea33)

Editor’s Note The purpose of this post is to offer some ideas about applying these analytics to what you currently do and improve how you evaluate your offensive execution.  You probably won’t be able to apply all of this, but hopefully you can use parts of it to help your players understand and measure how you want your team to play on offense.  

I have included the tables as a way to add context to the points that Dr. Shea makes.

NBA offenses are evolving. The increased reliance on 3-point shooting gets the most fanfare, but there is more to it than that. Teams are restructuring lineups and redesigning plays in hopes of improving all facets of shot selection, counterattacking with speed, and moving the ball faster.

When analytics assess offenses, it’s always a question of efficiency. Efficiency is the ultimate goal, but it relies on both good strategy and proper execution. And execution requires talent.

Dr. Shea has coauthored two books on the subject of utilizing analtyical data in basketball. You can find out more about both books by clicking on the links or images of the book covers below.

Basketball Analytics: Objective and Efficient Strategies for Understanding How Teams Win

Basketball Analytics: Spatial Tracking

How does one evaluate scheme independent of efficiency? Doing so would be a means to better understand if recent Brooklyn or Philadelphia squads were adapting to the modern game even when their efficiencies were below average. In other words, it would be a way to see if these teams that were thin on talent were “playing the right way.”

At the other end, there are almost certainly talented teams that aren’t keeping pace with recent trends among NBA offenses. It’s the best teams that have the least incentive to change. Said another way, desperation tends to precede innovation.

But talent can override a suboptimal offensive design, and so, efficiency metrics blur systems’ flaws.

We look back at the last three NBA seasons, and with a heavy reliance on spatial-tracking data, offer ways to assess shot selection, ball movement and counterattacking. In the end, we aggregate these markers to see which offenses have been the most progressive.

Shot Selection

Shots at the hoop, from behind the arc and at the free-throw line are the game’s most efficient.  The analytics are clear that teams should be building rosters and offenses with the intent of shifting a greater percentage of their shots to these attempts (where shots include trips to the free-throw line). To measure shot selection, we can look at just that—the percentage of a team’s shots that come from at the hoop, behind the arc or at the free throw line. (Again, a trip the free-throw line for two or three is considered a “shot.”)

Note that we’re looking at FGA and not FGM. This is a measure of shot choice and not efficiency.

Not surprisingly, Daryl Morey’s Rockets have had the three highest seasons in the last three years in regards to this metric.  (All seasons are listed in the table below.) The highest such percentage was the 2017 Rockets at 84%.

Teams are trending towards better shot selection. After the Rockets, the next five highest seasons in this metric came from 2017. Six of the bottom seven came from 2015.

The league average has risen from 63% in 2015 to 65% in 2016 to 67% in 2017.

 Rank Year  Team  Good Shot%
1 2017 Houston Rockets 0.84
2 2015 Houston Rockets 0.77
3 2016 Houston Rockets 0.77
4 2017 Brooklyn Nets 0.75
5 2017 Boston Celtics 0.74
6 2017 Cleveland Cavaliers 0.73
7 2017 Denver Nuggets 0.73
8 2017 Philadelphia 76ers 0.72
9 2015 Philadelphia 76ers 0.72
10 2016 Golden State Warriors 0.72

Ball Movement

The NBA’s abolishment of the illegal defense rule allowed NBA teams to help off the ball. Help defense limited the efficiency of isolation-driven offenses. The three-point line together with stricter whistles on physical play on and off the ball have provided an offensive counter-strategy. Teams that space with 3-point threats and quickly swing the ball force defenses into rotations that will free up a cutter to the hoop or a catch-and-shoot opportunity on the perimeter.

Shot selection metrics helps in the understanding of offensive spacing, but don’t directly get at ball movement. Two modern metrics constructed on spatial-tracking data do.

Seconds per touch is the average amount of time a player holds the ball before passing, shooting, drawing a foul, or turning the ball over. Quick ball movement leads to a lower average seconds per touch for the team.

In this metric Golden State is king. They’ve had three of the four best scores over the last three seasons.

The worst team in 2017 was Toronto. DeMar DeRozan doesn’t do much for the Raptors’ shot selection or ball movement.

Ball movement is good, but it’s often the specific action of stringing two swift passes together that generates great opportunities.

Secondary assists occur when a team makes two quick passes to a made shot. They are the so-called “hockey assists,” and an indicator of smart and rapid ball movement on offense.

Secondary assists per game are presented with seconds per touch in the table below. Golden State had the three best seasons.  Beyond Golden State, this is an area where San Antonio, Atlanta and Boston scored well.

(Secondary assists are linked to efficiency. It would be better to use secondary assist opportunities—two quick passes to a FGA—but this is not publicly available.)

 
Year  Team  Seconds per
Touch (NBA Rank)
 2ndAst/Gm
(NBA Rank)
2016 Warriors 2.39 (1) 9.68 (1)
2017 Warriors 2.43 (4) 9.65 (2)
2015 Warriors 2.41 (2) 7.91 (3)
2015 Spurs 2.52 (9) 7.51 (4)
2016 Hawks 2.49 (8) 7.29 (5)
2016 Spurs 2.64 (25) 7.12 (6)
2015 Hawks 2.54 (11) 7.07 (7)
2017 Celtics 2.56 (14) 6.84 (8)
2015 Bucks 2.72 (36) 6.73 (9)
2015 Clippers 2.70 (32) 6.57 (10)

Counterattack

It’s easier to score when the defense isn’t ready. Teams that can get out in transition will be rewarded with better opportunities.

Leicester City shocked the English Premier League with a counterattacking style in 2016. While not quite as shocking, Golden State has been the NBA’s equivalent in terms of scheme.

When Golden State gets possession, they counter fast. In 2014-15, 36% of their offense came between 2 and 9 seconds on the shot clock. That led the league, where the average was 26%. In total, the Warriors outscored their opponents by 1062 points (or 13 points per game) in that stretch of the shot clock. In the rest of the time, they were outscored by 229 points.

When teams attack fast, it also means that they usually get a shot up before all their players get down the floor on offense. This has the added benefit of providing good position for preventing opponents’ transition.  The offensive and defensive strategies complement each other, and the teams that execute it well will get out and score quickly while forcing long and difficult halfcourt possessions on their opponents.

A good measure of the extent to which a team attempts to counterattack is how fast they move on offense relative to defense. The table below displays the average speed of a player for the given team divided by the average speed of a player on defense only for each team.

 Rank  Year  Team  RelOSpeed
1 2016 Golden State Warriors 1.13
2 2015 Golden State Warriors 1.13
3 2017 Philadelphia 76ers 1.12
4 2017 Golden State Warriors 1.12
5 2016 New Orleans Pelicans 1.12
6 2017 Denver Nuggets 1.11
7 2015 San Antonio Spurs 1.11
8 2017 Portland Trail Blazers 1.11
9 2016 Charlotte Hornets 1.11
10 2017 Charlotte Hornets 1.11

Modern Offensive Strategy Score

The four statistics detailed in the previous three sections are not independent. Rather, the ideal modern offense will get out in transition with quick passing, and in doing so, create open looks from favorable locations.

We standardized the four statistics and then summed them. The result, which we call Modern Offensive Strategy Score (MOSS), is displayed below.

 Rank  Year  Team  GoodShot
%
 Sec per
Touch
 2ndAst
per Game
 RelO
Speed
 MOSS
1 2016 Warriors 0.72 2.39 9.68 1.13 10.27
2 2017 Warriors 0.72 2.43 9.65 1.12 9.19
3 2015 Warriors 0.66 2.41 7.91 1.13 7.32
4 2017 76ers 0.72 2.42 5.46 1.12 5.60
5 2016 Hawks 0.72 2.49 7.29 1.09 4.65
6 2015 Spurs 0.62 2.52 7.51 1.11 4.18
7 2017 Celtics 0.74 2.56 6.84 1.08 3.76
8 2017 Nuggets 0.73 2.74 6.00 1.11 3.65
9 2017 Nets 0.75 2.55 4.95 1.10 3.60
10 2016 Celtics 0.67 2.46 6.06 1.10 3.40
               

With all of the talent in Golden State, the intelligence in their offensive design is often overlooked. They have been playing a progressive style of basketball for several seasons, and they’ve blown out the field in MOSS.

The Lakers under head coach Byron Scott appeared oblivious to how the game was evolving, but new coach Luke Walton, hired from Golden State’s staff, has caught the team up in a hurry.

Tom Thibodeau hasn’t had the same impact in Minnesota.

MOSS is constructed with a focus on scheme over execution, and so, it should not correlate with offensive efficiency. In fact, as discussed above, it’s often the least talented teams that are the most innovative.

To understand if this modern playing style is effective (to teams other than Golden State), we have to compare teams to themselves.

NBA offensive rating is trending up in recent years. Across the league, it has risen from 105.6 to 106.4 to 108.8 in the last three seasons. MOSS has been trending with it. Average MOSS has gone from -0.50 to 0.10 to 0.40.

Among the 30 NBA teams, 25 saw an improvement in ORtg from 2016 and 2017. There were 17 teams that saw an improvement in MOSS, and all of those saw an improvement in ORtg. This means that among the 13 teams that saw their MOSS decline, 5 saw their ORtg follow.

Among the 17 teams that saw an improvement in MOSS, the average change in ORtg was +3.1 points per 100 possessions. Among the 13 that regressed in MOSS, the average change in ORtg was +1.3.

Final Thoughts

As the game evolves, it can be helpful to have means to assess the extent to which organizations are keeping pace.

MOSS indicates that Golden State, Philadelphia, Boston, Denver, Brooklyn, and Houston employ progressive offenses, even if some of those teams don’t yet have the talent to capitalize.

About the Author, Stephen Shea

Stephen Shea is an associate professor of mathematics at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, NH. He earned a Ph.D. in mathematics from Wesleyan University in Middletown, CT, and a B.A. in mathematics from The College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, MA. His mathematical expertise and publication record is in the areas of probability, statistics, dynamical systems, and combinatorics. For years, he has been applying his abilities in these areas to study professional and amateur sports.

Stephen is a managing partner of Advanced Metrics, LLC, a consulting company that provides analytics solutions to basketball and hockey organizations. At Saint Anselm College, he runs a course on sports analytics. His sport writing has been featured in the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, Psych Journal, the Expert Series at WinthropIntelligence.com, and the Stat Geek Idol Competition for TeamRankings.com.

Stephen has coauthored two books on the subject of utilizing analtyical data in basketball. You can find out more about both books by clicking on the links or images of the book covers below.

Basketball Analytics: Objective and Efficient Strategies for Understanding How Teams Win

Basketball Analytics: Spatial Tracking

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